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Abstract
The modern $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\gamma$ of games initiated by John von Neumann with the minimax theorem in
1928 has now grown to be an indispensable analytical framework for social sciences, and
economics in particular. In this paper, we shall review the $e$arly history ofgame theory from
von Neumann to John F. Nash, the founder of the noncooperative game theory, including
\’Emile Borel, Hugo Steinhaus and Oskar Morgenstern, thereby pointing out a hint of why
game theory has come to be widely applied in economics.
Introduction. One of the leading game theorists, Robert J. Aumann, has
won the Nobel prize in economics last year (2005), mainly for his earlier
contribution to market equilibrium through the cooperative game approach
[1]. Also, in 1994, the Nobel prize has been awarded to three game theo-
rists, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten for the foundation
and development of the theory of noncooperative games in the perspective
of economic theory. In vi $e\mathrm{w}$ of these facts, it seems worthwhile to consider
what the theory of games, cooperative and noncooperative, is all about. As a
first step, we shall review in this paper how a mathematical theory of games
was born in the first half of 20th century.
Around the Minimax Theorem. We will first take up John von Neu-
mann’s minimax theorem [28] in 1928. We will see this theorem is a first
monumental result in his attempt to formalize social behavior of rational
agents in the spirit of formalist approach, just like the work Mathematis-
che Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik [29] was an attempt to formalize the
new physics at that time. The minimax theorem solves the problem in the
two-person case completely.
A famous mathematician, \’Emile Borel, had studied a two-person game
[4], earlier than von Neumann’s minimax theorem. He considered an ex-
tended form of the game Paper, Stone, Scissors, introducing the concept of
mixed strategies and the iterated eliminaion ofweakly dominated strategies,
but without minimax theorem. Maurice Frechet therefore asserted later that
Borel should be the initiator of game theory $[9, 1953]$ . Hugo Steinhaus had
also studied two-person games slightly before the minimax theorem [39].
His two-person game was one that describes a pursuit of an escaping ship
with the conflicting objective of duration of pursuit. He is also interested
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in the game of fair division [40], and noted a solution due to B.Knaster and
S.Banach extending the divide and choose method.
We will see that these famous mathematicians did not anticipate the equal-
ity expressed in the minimax theorem. This is also the main point in the
negative response of von $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{u}\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{n}$ to the assertion of Fr\’echet $[9, 1953]$ .
Expanding Economy Model and Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem. In
1932, von Neumann contributed to economic theory with A Model ofGen-
eral Equilibrium [30]. This model describes the dual relation between the
expansion of commodity and value in a linear system. Our main concern
will be the lemma formulated to proved the existence of the economic equi-
librium, which, as the author noted, can be used as a topological, alternative
proof of the minimax theorem. This lemma is soon restated by Sizuo Kaku-
tani as a generalized fixed point theorem [11].
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{X}$ theorem and the model of expanding economy have become a
source of new analytical tools in modern economics after the World War II
based on the convexity in the structure of economic models.
Cooperative Game Theory. We next turn to the theory of cooperative
games initiated by von Neumann and an economist, Oskar Morgenstern.
In the book [31], von Neumann and Morgenstern presented an elementary
proof of the minimax theorem, and developed the theory of $\mathrm{n}$-person co-
operative games based on the minimax theorem. The essential ingredient
when considering $\mathrm{n}$-person situations is, to them, the possibility of forming
coalitions. Cooperation is described by a coalition $S$ of players which is a
subset of a finite set $N$ of players, and any coalition $S$ is assumed to play
a two-person zero-sum game against its complementary coalition $N\backslash S$ ,
thereby obtaining the minimax value describing the worth of the coalition.
Denoting by $v$ : $2^{N}arrow \mathrm{R}$ a real valued function that associates any coali-
tion $S$ with its value $v(S)$ , the $\mathrm{n}$ -person cooperative game is given by the
pair $(N,v)$ , in which players try to seek $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{O}\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{c}$or agreements as to the
payoffs in the game, that is, how to divide the total proceeds $v(N)$ obtainable
through the cooperation of all players.
As asolution concept, they defined astable set, which is aset $K$ of all
payoff $\mathrm{n}$-vectors that are not dominated by any payoff $\mathrm{n}$-vector in the set
$K$. Here, payoff $\mathrm{n}$-vector $x$ dominates another payoff $\mathrm{n}$-vector $y$ if for $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{o}\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{e}$
coalition $S,$ $x$ and $y$ are both obtainable and $x$ gives more than $y$ does to
each member of coalition $S$ . They interpreted a stable set as a standard of
behavior or social convention that is logically consistent with rational be-
havior. This is a solution concept quite unfamiliar in its form in the history
of mathematics.
Applying the solution to a three-person game, they discovered that two
players colluding and discriminating the remaining player in the payoffdis-
tribution can be a stable social convention (a discriminatory solution). Also,
in a trade of an indivisible commodity with one seller and two buyers, two
buyers colluding to lower the price can be a stable standard of behavior.
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Noncooperative Game Theory. By May of 1950, there appeared a
theory of games with $\mathrm{n}$ players acting independently; that is, the theory of
noncooperative games submitted by John F. Nash to Princeton University
as a doctoral thesis. In this theory, players do not form coalitions, and the
payoff to each player is explicitly dependent of strategies of all the playcrs.
The solution of the $\mathrm{g}a\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}$ is a profile of strategies of all players such that the
payoff to any player does not increase by a unilateral change of th$e$ strategy.
The solution, now called th$e$ Nash equilibrium, is not only a generalization
of the solution to the two-person $\mathrm{z}e\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}- \mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathfrak{m}$ game, but also has become $an$
indispensable tool in $\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}$ economic $an$alyses.
We will first review th$e$ works The Bargaining Problem $[23, 1950]$ , Non-
coopertive Games $[25, 1951]$ , and Two-Person Cooperative Games [26,
1953]. The first one presents the well known solution “Nash product $\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}-$
imization“ to a $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathfrak{m}$ of two-person bargaining via the axiomatic ap-
proach, just like in the manner that vo$n$ Neumann and Morgenstern treated
utility theory in [31]. This is the first solution to the problem of bilateral
monopoly studied unsuccessfully by famous economists such as Hicks and
Edgeworth.
The theory of noncooperative games was introduced in the doctoral the-
sis and published as one-page paper in Proceedings of the National Acad-
emy ofSciences $[24, 1950]$ , and later in Annals ofMathematics $[25, 1951]$ .
Existence of equilibrium points was proved in the former $[24, 1950]$ via
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, and by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem in
the latter which is much more elegant than the former.
Th$e$ two-person cooperative game is a reformulation of the Bargaining
Problem into a strate$g$ic form, generating the Nash product maximization as
a unique equilibrium point in the game, which also generalizes the minimax
theorem to non zero-sum (but strictly competitive) games. At the same
time , this game is an excellent illustration of the analysis according to th $\mathrm{e}$
”Nash Program,” which is proposed in the paper as a methodology of game
analysis that cooperation should be described as an cquilibrium behavior.
Bounded Rationality and Evolutionary Interpretations. Nash gave
a ”$\mathfrak{m}a\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}$-action” interpretation of how to attain an equilibrium point in the
$\mathrm{P}h\mathrm{D}$ thesis, which was deleted in the publication $[25, 1951]$ . The essential
idea is what we now know as th$e$fictitious play by boundedly rational play-
ers. Another bounded-rationality related $\mathrm{i}d\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}$ can be seen in th$\mathrm{e}$ mapping
constructed to prove the existence of equilibrium points by the Brouwer
fixed point theorem. The mapping that associates a new mixed strategy
with a current mixed strategy can be interpreted as a static version of what
we now know as the replicator dynamic in evolutionary game theory.
Still, Nash gave bounded-rationality $\mathrm{r}e$lated comments on the result of
an experimen$t$ conducted by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in the early
$1950\mathrm{s}$ (due to A.Roth’s paper [36]). The $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{e}$ devised for the experiment
is what we now know as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and 100 times repetition
$\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$not to support the Nash equilibrium. The main point ofNash’s com-
ment is that the repetition makes the $g$ame different from the one-shot play,
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and the backward induction would be hard to be operated by ordinary peo-
ple so that the result would be better approximated by thc repeated-game
strate$g\mathrm{y}$ that is today called th $\mathrm{e}$ grim trigger strategy. Moreover, Nash pro-
posed that th $\mathrm{e}$ experiment be conducted under the mutual $\mathrm{i}$gnorance of op-
ponent’s actions and players be $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}n\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathfrak{m}1y$ matched in each round to observe
even more interesting behavior. Such a kind of experiment was in fact con-
duc$t\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ thirty years or more later by Robert Axelrod $[3, 1984]$ with players
being computer programms playing th$e$ Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Concluding Remarks. We conclude with a remark that while Nash’s
noncooperative game theory has been well embedded in modem economic
theory, von Neumann’s ’program’ to formalize social sciences appears to
hav$e$ been only partially fulfilled. We $\mathrm{m}ay$ therefore wish to expect the
Rob$e\mathrm{r}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{u}\mathfrak{m}\mathrm{a}n$n’s winning the Nobel prize to be the beginning of formal-
ization by the full game theory; that is, by cooperative game theory as well
as noncooperative game theory.
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